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SUMMARY
The first 45 flights of the X-15 airplane demonstrated the adequacy of the
manual aerodynamic control system and the stability augmentation system to meet
the operational control requirements for flight to a Mach number of approxi-
mately 6.04 and an altitude of about 217,000 feet. The airplane was lightly
damped in all axes with dampers off and encountered regions of lateral-
directional uncontrollability. Although the pilots considered the control
system to be adequate for the X-15 design flight envelope, some improvement in
the system was necessary for extension beyond this envelope.
A limit cycle_ or residual oscillation, primarily in roll was observed at
flight conditions of high dynamic pressure with high stability-augmentation-
system gains. Also_ structural frequencies of the airplane control surfaces
were excited in flight, and the vibrations were sustained by the stability
augmentation system with phase-lead shaping. These phenomena dictated that
corrective modifications be made to the flight control system to provide the
necessary safety and reliability for flight.
Malfunctions of the stability augmentation system affected 25 percent of
the X-15 free flights. Seventy percent of these malfunctions were the result of
human error. Although the overall flight reliability of the stability-
augmentation-system components does not meet specifications at this time_
current trends indicate that the system will approach adequate reliability
during the flight period now in progress.
INTRODUCTION
Early in the design of the X-15 research airplane_ it became obvious that
stability augmentation would be required over much of the flight envelope. A
cooperative design team of personnel from North American Aviation_ Inc., the
U. S. Air Force, the U. S. Navy, and the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration specified_ therefore_ that the X-15 flight control system would include
a stability augmentation system for all three axes_ with emphasis on simplicity_
reliability_ and versatility for research purposes.
North American Aviation, which was directly responsible for the development
of the airplane and its systems_ conducted many of the design tests reported
herein. Flight tests were conducted by the NASAFlight Research Center at
Edwards_ Calif. This paper presents the characteristics of the basic flight
control system and the stability augmentation system and discusses the opera-
tional performance and reliability of the flight control system during the perio_
from December i, 1958, to January i, 1962. The data were obtained in 30 flights
with the interim LRII engines and 15 flights with the XLR99engine, and extend
to a Machnumber of about 6.04 and an altitude of approximately 217,000 feet.
Simulator data cover the entire design flight envelope of the X-15_ that is_ to
a Mach number of 6 and an altitude of 250,000 feet.
A brief r@sum_of the flight history of the X-15 stability augmentation
system is presented in the appendix.
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duty cycle (mission duration), hr
lateral stick forcej lb
rudder pedal forc% ib
longitudinal stick force_ ib
frequency, cycles/sec
radar altitude_ ft
roll-damper gain-selector-switch position
pitch-damper gain-selector-switch position
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side-stick deflection_ in.
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x-15 AIRPLANE
General Description
The X-15 is a single-place rocket-powered research vehicle designed for
flight at hypersonic speed and extreme altitude. A three-view drawing of the
airplane is shown in figure I. The physical characteristics and detailed design
information are included in reference i.
Control is provided through conventional aerodynamic surfaces_ except that
the horizontal tail provides both pitch and roll control. Yaw control is pro-
vided by upper and lower vertical surfaces. The movable portion of the lower
vertical surface is jettisonable for landing ground-clearance. All aerodynamic
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control surfaces are actuated by two independent irreversible hydraulic systems.
The pilot's aerodynamic controls consist of the conventional center stick
and rudder pedals_ and a side stick located on the pilot's right (fig. 2). In
addition_ a controller positioned on the pilot's left activates the nonaero-
dynamic reaction control rockets.
The X-15 aircraft utilized in the early investigations were powered by two
LRII rocket engines which produced a sea-level thrust of 13_000 pounds. Later
flights were made with the XLR99 rocket engine which produces 57_000 pounds of
thrust at sea level.
Basic Aerodynamic Control System
Although the basic X-15 control system has several unusual features_ the
design concepts are conventional. Figure 3 shows the basic pitch and roll
control system as an irreversible hydraulic system with artificial feel. The
mechanical linkages_ which are mass balanced_ couple the control sticks and
rudder pedals to the hydraulic actuator-control valves.
The horizontal stabilizers are used for both pitch and roll contro!_
deflecting conventionally for pitch control and differentially for roll control.
The pitch and roll linkages are integral and are designed to transmit both
control modes simultaneously by mechanical summing in the left and right mixer
mechanisms located in the cockpit area. The basic-control-system force and
displacement characteristics are presented in figures 4(a) to 4(n). The
longitudinal-control mode employs a nonlinear gearing to give a lower-surface-
to-stick displacement through neutral to minimize sensitivity_ overcontrol_ and
pilot-induced oscillations. The basic control system employs cable-tension
regulators which are necessary because of changes in cable length as a result of
variation in temperature during flight.
The side-located stick is provided for use during periods of high acceler-
ation. This stick is located forward of the right-hand seat armrest and is
mechanically linked to the center stick through two dualized hydraulic boost
actuators; thus_ the side stick tracks the center stick at all times. The boost
actuators reduce the side-stick pilot-ccntrol forces and synchronize the side-
and center-stick displacements. The current X-15 configuration has boost
(force) ratios of 4:1 in pitch and 2.7:1 in roll. The side-stick neutral
position is adjustable longitudinally through a range of ±i inch. Both sticks
have a common feel-force bungee and have longitudinal trim capability_ which is
achieved by shifting the zero-force position of the feel bungee to a stick
position corresponding to the desired horizontal-stabilizer position.
The pilot has control authority over the range from 15 ° to -35 ° stabilizer
deflection in pitch_ ±15 ° differential-stabilizer deflectionin roll_ and ±7._ °
vertical-stabilizer deflection in yaw. The pilot-controlled longitudinal trim
range is from 5 ° to -20 ° horizontal-stabilizer deflection. Roll and yaw trim
range is ±2 ° and is ground-adjustable only.
Stability Augmentation System
The major components of the stability augmentation system (SAS) are: three
rate gyros_ two pitch-roll servocylinders_ one yaw servocylinder_ electronic-
case assembly (ECA)_ gain-selector-switch assembly and function-switch assembly
(GSSA). Figure 5 shows the relative location of the components within the air-
plane_ and figure 6 is a functional block diagram of the SAS. Basically_ the
system consists of an electronic network or channel for each axis. This network
senses the aircraft rate of change of pitch_ roll_ and yaw and automatically
provides signals to the respective servocylinders that cause the surface actu-
ators to move the horizontal and vertical stabilizers to oppose the airplane
angular rates. Individual servocylinder outputs and the pilot's manual inputs
are combined to form a single input to the surface actuators. The pitch and
roll channels operate singly or in combination at the pilot's discretion. Since
the horizontal stabilizers are used for both pitch and roll control_ the left
and right servocylinders control the stabilizers for both pitch and roll damping.
The yaw channel operates independently of the pitch and roll channels. In
addition_ a signal from the yaw gyro proportional to yaw rate is fed into the
roll channel. This is termed the "yar" channel. Therefore_ the left and right
servocylinder outputs at any given time are an algebraic sum of pitch_ roll_ and
yaw signals_ when all channels are operating. Yar-damper off does not affect
roll or yaw damping_ but roll-damper off makes the yar damper inoperative. The
yaw-servocylinder output is a result of yaw-rate input only.
The authority of the stability augmentation system is equal to the pilot's
authority in pitch and yaw and to twice the pilot's authority in roll. Figure 7
shows the pilot and damper commandenvelope for the horizontal stabilizers which
provide pitch and roll control and damping. The pilot has on-off and feedback
gain control of the SAS_which enables him to vary the gains throughout the
flight envelope. Table I lists the stability-augmentation-system gain settings
in terms of servocylinder stroke and surface deflection.
To provide fail-safety_ the SAS contains dual channels in all modes. The
working channel drives the servocylinders. The monitor channel operates
electronically simulated servocylinders_ and compares the outputs to those of
the working channel (see fig. 6). Whenthe difference between the servocylinder
position and the simulated servocylinder position exceeds i0 percent (0.i0 in.)
in any channel_ a failure is signaled and the servocylinder centers and locks_
disengaging the SAS. Differences can occur because of electrical or mechanical
malfunction. A warning light for each channel is provided to indicate to the
pilot that the system is in "standby" (steady light) or that a failure (blinking
light) has occurred. The pilot may reset each channel by switching the function
switches to "standby" and returning them to the "engaged" position. If the
malfunction no longer exists_ the failure light remains out and the channel is
engaged. Electrical power and hydraulics are monitored_ and the stability
augmentation system is disengaged when either or both fall below preset opera-
tional limits.
In the pitch and roll channels_ a failure in one channel does not interfere
with normal operation of the other channel if the failure is forward of the
point at which the signals are combined. If a failure occurs in both channel%
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the servocylinder automatically centers and locks. In the yaw channel_ a single
failure causes the yaw servocylinder to center and lock by a spring-loaded
action. The yar channel_ exclusive of the yaw gyro_ is considered functionally
to be a part of the roll channel. A failure in the yar channel_ with the
exception of the yaw gyro_ does not disengage the yaw channel. Any failure in
the yar circuits is monitored by the roll-channel monitor and indicated by the
roll-channel warning light.
The working and monitor channels_ exclusive of power supplies_ have no
common electrical components_ and all major electronic networks are molded into
individual potted modules. Fail-safety dualization of the SAS does not exist
for the rate gyros_ servocylinders_ and hydraulics_ but the rate gyros utilize
dual pickoffs and the servos utilize dual-position feedback pickoffs. The SAS
electrical load can be carried by either of the two main power units in the
airplane. Hydraulic system No. i supplies the SAS yaw servocylinder_ and system
No. 2 supplies the left and right servos.
The fail-safe characteristics of the SAS were determined and analyzed by
using the X-15 six-degree-of-freedom flight simulator at North American
Aviation_ Inc. Systematically programed single and dual failures were intro-
duced during various phases of simulated flight. Single failures within the
dualized areas of the SAS created the unbalance required for tripout and servo-
cylinder locking of the affected damper mode with little stick or airplane
transient motion and little servocycling prior to locking. In the nondualized
areas_ only gyro failures of a mechanical nature produced potentially dangerous
conditions. Only dual failures of a reinforcing type_ which occurred simulta-
neously and caused hard-over or severe oscillatory servocycling signals_ were
found to be potentially dangerous. In all of the failures studied_ it was
determined that the pilot could retain aircraft control or manually disengage
the affected dampers before catastrophic conditions were reached.
X-15 FLIGHT SIMULATOR
The X-15 flight simulator is a full-scale_ ground-based reproduction of the
X-15 cockpit and control systems. All instruments and systems are electrically
and hydraulically actuated_ with the aerodynamics and performance provided by
analog computers. Flight system study and flight missions can be evaluated from
piloted flight in six degrees of freedom.
A detailed description of the simulator is presented in reference 2.
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES
Basic Control System
Extensive operational testing of the manual flight control system was made
with the flight control simulator and the X-15 aircraft. Abrupt inputs in each
of the three axes and piloted maneuvers were used to determine the adequacy of
the control system. The results revealed no instabilities in the control-stick
system_ and the side-to-center-stick tracking was found to be excellent.
However_ in roll_ when excessive restraint was applied to the center stick and
the side stick was then abruptly disturbed_ a sustained side-stick oscillation
was induced as long as the center stick was restrained. Because of the high
magnitude of center-stick restraint necessary to obtain this condition_ no
modification has been considered necessary.
No significant deterioration of the flight components of the system was
noted through usage.
The design and the actual force and displacement characteristics of the
basic X-15 control system are compared in figure 4. Nonlinear gearing in the
pitch mode is apparent. The slight upturn occurring in pitch stick force at
20° trailing edge up (fig. 4(b)) is caused by a boost bungee which becomes
effective at this point to provide a more linear force characteristic for the
nonlinear gearing. Breakout forces are considered by the X-15 pilots to be
satisfactory for the entire X-15 program_ although all control forces are lower
than the design curve.
Development.- During the development and flight testing of the basic
control system_ several deficiencies were noted and modifications were initiated.
Onemajor deficiency still exists in the pitch-roll manual control system.
Since the same horizontal-stabilizer linkages effect pitch and roll control_ the
artificial feel-force bungees are_ of nec_ssity_ located in the cockpit area.
This forward location of ground points allows the pivot points of the actuator-
input walking beams to move under the influence of SAS servocylinder outputs_
because of the large number of linkages involved. Attempted mechanical modifi-
cations_ such as preloading_ have not eliminated the problem.
A nonlinear gearing for the roll control (figs. 4(k) to (n)), similar to
that used in pitch_ has been installed in the X-15 aircraft to reduce lateral-
control sensitivity about zero and minimize pilot tendency to overcontrol. The
ratio of stick displacement and stick force to surface deflection was increased
about i00 percent by the addition of the nonlinear gearing. Data from the three
flights in which the modified gearing was used show no significant change in
handling qualities_ and the pilots report no apparent difference in the control
characteristics.
The flight simulator has been used to evaluate modification to both the
pitch and roll side-stick boost-cylinder control-valve centering bungees. The
bungees have been stiffened to effect a force increase proportional to the rate
of stick deflection. The effect was felt in both sticks and was similar to rate
limiting rather then to the desired viscous damping of the control sticks. The
pilots reported that the effect of the bungee alteration was desirabl% but they
felt that the restraining effect was excessive. Further tests are being made in
an attempt to attain an optimum design.
A modification which increases the pilot-controlled longitudinal trim range
from -20 ° to -25 ° trailing-edge-up stabilizer deflection has been used in two
flights. The modification has proved to be desirabl% inasmuch as it allows the
pilot to trim to higher angles of attack.
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Pilot evaluation.- Seven pilots have flown the X-IT airplanes. Based on
flight and simulator experience, all the pilots agreed that control was improved
by increasing the horizontal-surface rate from the original 1T deg/sec to
25 deg/sec and increasing the longitudinal trim limit from -20 ° to -25 ° . The
pilots have had no major difficulty in performing the required control tasks,
nor have they reported a lack of positive control of the airplane. They reported
varying degrees of control sensitivity when using the side stick, especially in
roll. Early in the program, the center stick was preferred tothe side stick;
however, after the pilots gained more experience with the side stick, they rated
it as equal to the center stick, and_ in many cases, even indicated a preference
for the side stick. (An inflated pressure suit interferes with normal center-
stick operation_ for example.) The pilots agree that center-stick operation is
satisfactory and that rudder control is too coarse for use under marginally
controllable flight conditions. While extreme rearward side-stick deflection is
being maintained_ the pilots report experiencing a form of wrist lock when
lateral-control movements are attempted. This creates both a sense of awkward-
ness and imprecise control inputs. Lessening the force by increasing the trim
range has helped to alleviate the problem. The pilots report difficulty and
inadvertent control inputs when holding forward force on the side stick and
operating the thumb trim wheel. General improvement in side-stick performance
could be made by relocating the lateral-control pivot point from a position
below the forearm to a position on the axis of the forearm. The pilots indicated
that a stepped-type trim button would be preferable to a continuous-type trim
button.
Stability Augmentation System
Data obtained in X-15 flights from December 19T 8 to January 1962 were
analyzed to determine the operational performance of the SAS. The study revealed
that the system has performed consistently at all gain settings tested, shown
no apparent deterioration, and operated within design tolerances. With the SAS
operating at nominal gain settings of 8-6-8 (pitch, roll, and yaw_ respectively),
speed and altitude missions in excess of the X-IT design envelope may be made
(ref. 3). This single-setting potential was not anticipated during the X-IT
design and early development periods.
The dynamic effects of the damper on airplane motions were investigated by
making pilot-initiated pulses about all three axes with the dampers on and off.
Figures 8(a) to 8(c) present typical time histories which show the increase in
damping when SAS is used in all three axes. The data were obtained by operating
the X-15 flight simulator so that the SAS-on and SAS-off responses could be
compared at exactly the same flight conditions. The damping shows an obvious
improvement in all three axes with the SAS on. The handling qualities are, of
course, also greatly improved about all three axes because of the increased
damping. Damping is especially important in roll because it serves to reduce
the lateral-control sensitivity.
Longitudinal pulses were made and evaluated in the Mach number range
between 0.6 and 4. 5 . With dampers off, the airplane motion was found to be
lightly damped, and the damping decreased with increasing Mach number (M > I).
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With the pitch damper at the minimum gain setting_ damping of the airplane
oscillations was rated as acceptable by the pilots. For all conditions inves_i-
gated_ the longitudinal oscillations were readily controlled by the pilots.
The lateral motions of the airplane were investigated in the _ch number
range between 0.6 and 4.5. For all conditions investigated with roll dampers
off_ the airplane oscillations were poorly damped_ with coupling in roll and
yaw. Although the pilots reported high roll-control sensitivity with dampers
off_ all conditions were controllable except for Mach numbers greater than 2.2
at angles of attack greater then 8 ° . At these conditions_ a pilot-airplane
lateral-directional divergemce was encountered that was uncontrollable when
normal piloting techniques were used (ref. 3). This phenomenon has made the use
of the SAS a necessity at angles Of attack greater than 8 ° . With a nominal roll-
damper gain setting_ the airplane rolling motions were well damped. A small-
amplitude residual (limit cycle) oscillation was apparent at high dynamic pres-
sures and high roll-damper gain settings. This phenomenon is discussed subse-
quently. The pilots reported a satisfactory sense of positive lateral control
with the roll damper on.
Directional airplane motions were investigated in the _ch number range
between 0.6 and 5.6. In general_ the airplane exhibited good directional
stability in the speed and altitude regions investigated with the yaw damper off_
but at the higher Mach numbers and high angles of attack_ the yawing oscillations
were neutrally damped to slightly divergent. With the yaw damper on_ these
airplane motions were well damped.
The yar-damping mode is provided to counteract the rolling moment produced
by deflection of the vertical tail at elevated angles of attack. At these
angles_ reduced effectiveness of the upper vertical tail and increased effec-
tiveness of the lower vertical tail create a rolling moment proportional to the
vertical-tail deflection.
Additional information on the aerodynamic effects of the stability augmen-
tation system are presented in reference 4.
Problems.- Limit cycles_ or residual oscillations_ caused by the stability
augmentation system were encountered first in the X-15 flight simulator. Phase
lag produced by the hysteresis and dead band at very small amplitudes caused the
limit cycles_ which existed in all three axes when the damper gain and control
power were high. The hysteresis is the result of the free play in the control
linkages between the bungees and the walking beams of the basic control system.
In the early flight program_ limit cycles of small amplitude were observed in
the flight records_ but were unnoticed by the pilots. In subsequent flights to
higher dynamic pressur% the pilots reported limit-cycle oscillations in roll.
Generally_ the limit-cycle appeared when the roll-damper gain setting was
greater than 6 and the dynamic pressure greater than 500 ib/sq ft. These limit
cycles are a function of SAS gain and control effectiveness (ref. 4). The pitch
limit cycle occurred at a higher gain than in roll at a given dynamic pressure.
Although the pilots have been aware of the yaw limit cycle on occasion during
the higher performance flights_ it has not been a problem. The roll limit cycle
produced the largest amplitude; however_ this amplitude was less than i ° change
in bank angle at frequencies of I cps to 3 cps.
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Figure 9 compares the limit-cycle characteristics of the X-15 airplane
ground tests (aerodynamics were simulated by an analog computer), the X-15 flight
simulator, and the available X-15 flight data. In general, these three types of
data are comparable, but the limit-cycle characteristics are more severe for the
X-15 flight simulator than for actual X-15 flight at the same given conditions.
In an initial effort to alleviate the limit-cycle problem, phase lead was
increased in the system by removing the original shaping which had provided
system lag. Subsequent flights with this configuration resulted in a limit
cycle of lower amplitude at higher frequency. Although this was a more accept-
able system in regard to limit cycles, the SAS then became susceptible to a
high-frequency (12 to 13 cps) vibration, discussed in the following paragraph.
Additional analysis and discussion of the limit-cycle problem are presented in
reference 4.
The X-15 horizontal surfaces are very lightly damped as a result of their
rigid, welded construction. Excitation at their natural frequencies results in
a closed-loop vibration, which couples the surface vibration and the SAS gyros
through the inertial reaction of the fuselage. A resonance of 13 cps, corre-
sponding to the first bending mode of the horizontal stabilizer, is caused by
the SAS. Actuator rate-limiting confines the output to 2 ° peak-to-peak differ-
ential surface deflection. The vibration has occurred in both pitch and roll.
Development.- A vibration at high SAS gains during the first X-15 captive
flight was eliminated by relocating the gyro package from the instrument com-
partment to the center-of-gravity compartment, thus removing the gyro from a
point influenced by fuselage bending.
In an effort to alleviate both the limit-cycle and vibration problems_ a
high-response "notch filter" was investigated to lower the system response at the
structural-vibration frequency of the horizontal surfaces. Phase character-
istics of the filter were chosen so that phase shifts in the frequency range of
the limit cycle were more tolerable. The filter was mechanized on an analog
computer and ground tested on the actual aircraft individually in each mode and
simultaneously in all modes. The problem of the sustained vibration appears to
be eliminated. Another solution being investigated is a pressure-feedback main-
actuator control valve which will provide damping to the actuator at the natural
frequency of the horizontal surface. Initial tests indicate that the valve is
highly desirable, but further development is required to finalize the configu-
ration and characteristics.
To provide operational redundancy, an independent pitch-roll SAS backup
system has been developed. This package operates at a fixed gain level (ground
preset), contains its own sensors, has minimum electronics, and feeds directly
to the existing SAS servos. The system contains no fail-safe features, is
"pilot-elect" switch-controlled, and designated for emergency use only. When
the pilot elects to use this system, it will automatically function upon failure
of the normal SAS roll mode.
Inasmuch as the final SAS preflight check is made 3 to 15 days prior to
flight, a pilot "in-flight" test system was provided for a prelaunch test of all
SAS electrical functions (both working and monitor channels), except the gyros,
at one ground preset level.
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Flight simulator studies of SASfail-safe features disclosed a need for
dualization of servocylinder feedback wiring to enable the malfunction detector
to detect electrical failure. The dualization was accomplished during the
demonstration flight program. Also incorporated into the hydraulic system was
an auxiliary SAShydraulic package comprised of a self-contained reservoir and a
hydraulic motor/pump assembly driven by the No. i main hydraulic system. This
package provides hydraulic power directly to the left and right SAS servo-
cylinders in the event of a failure of the No. 2 auxiliary power unit_ but
retains the independence between the main hydraulic systems. The package con-
tains no electrical components and enters operation automatically by a pressure-
priority-selector valve.
Pilot evaluation.- As a result of flight or simulator experience_ or both_
all X-15 pilots generally agree that the SAS functions well as a damper. They
believe that the maximum gain capability of the SAS is sufficient for the entire
X-15 flight envelope_ and that the dampers reduce the lateral-control
sensitivity. Roll damping is required to fly the X-15 maximum-performance
flights_ particularly during atmospheric entry at high angles of attack when the
airplane is uncontrollable (ref. 3) without dampers. Because of this need for
dampers_ all the pilots desired hydraulic duality or hydraulic package backup
for the pitch-roll system and a redundant or other backup system for the roll
damper. The pilots rated the importance of the SAS modes as roll_ pitch_ and
yaw. They found the roll limit cycles to be annoying during higher performance
flights and believed they should be eliminated or reduced. No pilot wished to
make another flight with the phase-lead shaping which sustained the high-
frequency vibration.
All of the pilots desire improvement in the SAS gain-selectorknobs_ since
the heavy flight gloves provide a poor knob grip and cover the switch-position
numbers when the switches are being operated. The pilots find the SAS console
difficult to reach under the normal seat and head restraints_ and practically
impossible to reach in an inflated pressure suit.
Reliability
Reliability tests.- Design specifications of the stability augmentation
system required that: (i) The probability of no failure of the stability
augmentation system would be at least 0.995 during any (each) flight throughout
the life of the airplane. Airplane life is defined as i00 one-half-hour flights
plus 5 hours between flights_ for a total of 550 hours. (2) Servocylinders
would operate i0 missions or 50 hours under thermal cycling_ plus 50 ground hours
without maintenance and i00 missions before complete replacement. (3) All com-
ponents would be capable of a minimum of 650 hours of operation before complete
unit replacement_ and the entire system (including servocylinders and ship's
wiring) would have a minimum mean-time-to-failure(MTF) of i00 hours.
Reliability tests of the stability augmentation system were conducted using
the finalized electronics-case assembly (ECA). Prior service-life testing for
design deficiencies showed that the ECA represented the mean-time-to-failure of
the entire SAS. The ECA was subjected to a series of duty-cycle tests of
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85 minutes duration at all environmental conditions. The SASoperated for
53 minutes of each test cycle. A total of _68 duty cycles_ representing
500 hours of ECAoperation, was required for the test. During these tests,
3 modules failed, which resulted in an acceptable MTFof 167 hours.
The following tabulation, which compares the module failure rates under
three different environmental conditions, indicates that the failure rate is
affected by temperature cycling:
Operation
Service-life test
Reliability test
Flight simulator
Temperature profile
Severe (185° F to -60 ° F)
Moderate (140° F to-20 ° F)
Roomtemperature
Module failure
i0 in 461 hours
3 in 500 hours
0 in 1,000 hours
Operational reliability.- The X-15 program offers the opportunity for
accurate documentation of the SAS failures over the entire operational life of
the system. The data presented in this paper cover the 37 months following
delivery of the first of four flight-qualified systems which have been used with
two X-15 aircraft. SAS malfunctions have affected 25 percent of the X-15 free
flights (20 percent of the total captive plus free flights). Of the X-15 free
flights, 8 were elected to be flown with a known SAS failure. The total mal-
functions incurred in flight were 7 in pitch_ 7 in roll, and i in yaw. In only
one flight did more than one damper mode simultaneously malfunction.
Reliability data are presented herein in the categories of (i) flight
operation, covering power-on time, from close-out for flight (essentially_ B-52
engine start) through landing stop of X-15; (2) field service operation_
extending from SAS preflight for the first captive X-15 flight through the final
flight, including only power-on hours used in preflighting and actual flight;
and (3) total operation_ from delivery of the first SAS to January i, 1962,
including all ground and flight power-on system operation.
During the total operational period of 1,610 SAS hours, 107 individual SAS
components failed. Of these, i00 failed during ground servicing, and 7 failed
after the system was closed out for flight. Figure i0 is the complete failure
record for the X-15 program. As expected, most of the failures occurred early
in the program when operation was at a maximum and technical experience at a
minimum. Of the components, the modules failed most frequently. Detailed study
of the failed modules revealed that transistor malfunction was the most common
cause of the failures.
Table II divides SAS categories into significant periods. The "Projected
flight operation" category consists of the current trends projected to completion
of the X-15 program. The flight operations categories are broken down into take-
off to landing (as they affect cost, time, and program progress) and launch to
landing (affecting safety-of-flight and mission success). The "Total field
service operations" category is broken down into the LRII engine period_ which
was the development period for systems, and the XLR99 engine period_ which was
the flight-data research period. For comparison, the design specification_
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environmental service life_ and reliability tests are listed. From the stand-
point of component failure_ the overall operational reliability R has been:
total fligh% 91.5 percent; free-flight phas% 97.6 percent; field operation_
35 percent; and total operation_ 26.4 percent.
Figure ii presents faired curves of component failure for the field service
period. Also included_ for comparison_ is the flight-failure curve. It can be
readily seen that the failure rate is decreasing_ as evidenced by the slope of
the curves approaching zero.
Malfunctions are defined as any interruption of normal operation; therefor%
it is possible to encounter more component failures than malfunctions if the
failure does not affect component operation. "Permanent" malfunctions occur
when a damper mode trips out and the pilot cannot effect reengagement; "inter-
mittent"malfunctions occur when a damper mode trips ou% but the pilot can
immediately effect reengagement. Figure 12 is the complete flight-malfunction
history of the SAS. Most of the malfunctions occurred early in the program. If
the X-15 had been an unmannedvehicle_ such as a missile_ and if mission success
had depended on no system malfunction after system close-ou% 7 of the i0 maiden
X-15 flights would have failed.
Table III presents a breakdown of the malfunctions affecting flight and the
period in which the malfunction occurred_ regardless of the time of discovery.
Permanent failure was the predominant malfunction and occurred_ in all but one
instanc% during the captive flight phase. The overall flight reliability in
relation to system malfunction has been 86.1 percent.
Table IV lists the average failure and malfunction rates during the various
phases of the X-15 program. As can be seen_ the rates decrease by an average
factor of 4 between the initial and final periods.
Future X-15 flights should attain the extremes in speed and altitude of the
flight envelope. At the system's current overall performance level_ the proba-
bility of the success (that is_ no component failure during free flight) of five
projected missions is 88.4 percent. The probability of success (no system
malfunction during free-flight phase) of all five missions is 24.7 percent.
It is evident from the data trends that the SAShas entered the period (of
undetermined duration) of adequate reliability before true wearout failure
becomes predominant. This indicates that the system should be used at X-15
maximumperformance in the immediate future.
Eighty percent of all malfunctions affecting flight occurred during the
first 40 percent of the flight program. During the first 50 percent of the
flight program_ 80 percent of all component failures occurred. Eighty-six
percent of the component failures affecting flight and 70 percent of the mal-
functions affecting flight were directly attributable to humanerror in serv-
icing and handling. Thirty-five percent of the total components which have
failed to date were the result of humanerror during ground maintenance opera-
tions. It is also noteworthy that all but one of the seven component failures
affecting flight were the result of human error which was not detected prior to
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flight, and that 50 percent of these fai lures were external of the actual SAS in 
the form of a break in the ship's wiring . Failures attributable to human error 
have decreased with time because of increased familiarity with the system and 
improved maintenance and inspection procedures. Sixty-five percent of the 
failures did not involve the electronics -case assembly, which was expected to be 
the area of least reliability. Only once did a damper channel permanently 
malfunction after launch; however, in all instances, the flights could have been 
terminated before the committed portion. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Flight and simulator studies of the X- l5 control system encompassing the 
flight envelope of the X-15 airplane show that the manual aerodynamic control 
system and the stab i lity augmentation system are adequate for the X-15 flight 
envelope. 
A stability-augmentation- system limit cycle, primarily in roll, occurred 
during flight at dynamic pressures greater than 500 lb/sq ft and roll gain 
settings equal to or greater than 6 . With high- response lead shaping, the limit 
cycles were reduced to an acceptable level but gave rise to a high-frequency 
sustained vibration of the horizontal stabilizers. A "notch filter" is being 
incorporated to minimize both problems. 
There has been no apparent deterioration of the control systems through 
usage. 
The pilots expressed the need for redundancy in the roll damper for exten-
sion of the flight envelope . Modifications were made during the current flight 
program to improve the reliability, fail - safety, and operational characteristics 
of the systems. 
Transistor failure was found to be the most common ~ause of module failures . 
The free - flight reliability of the stability-augmentatio:1- system components has 
been 97.6 percent . Malfunctions have affected 25 percen-~ of the free flights, 
but the malfunction rate has decreased with experience and technical familiarity 
with the system. Eighty- six percent of the component failures affecting flight 
were the result of human error. Seventy percent of the malfunctions affecting 
flight were caused by human error . Although the overall flight reliability does 
not meet specifications at this time, the current trend indicates that the 
system will approach adequate reliability during the flight period now in 
progress . 
Flight Research Center, 
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
Edwards, Calif ., September 19, 1962. 
APPENDIX
X-15 FLIGHT HISTORY WITH THE STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM
A brief r6sum$ of the flight history of the X-15 stability augmentation
system is presented. In 80 attempts; 24 flights of X-15-1 and 21 flights of
X-15-2 have been made successfully. Fifteen of the flights were performed with
the XLR99 engine.
Of the seven X-15 pilots_ only three have experienced SAS failure or
malfunction. One pilot has had four damper failures (all prelaunch)_ three
flight nuisance tripouts_ and 18 seconds of high-frequency vibration after
landing. Another pilot has had one damper failure (prelaunch) and one flight
nuisance tripout. The third pilot has had two damper failures (one prelaunch)_
two flight nuisance tripouts; and 57 seconds of high-frequency vibration during
flight. All pilots have had flight experience with various damper modes inten-
tionally inoperative and extensive flight-simulator time under normal and SAS-
failed conditions.
x-15-1
On flight I-C-1% SAS checks during flight revealed system vibration at
high (8-8-8) gain settings. The gyro package was subsequently relocated to the
center-of-gravity compartment.
The first free flight (1-1-5) was made with the pitch damper failed; this
was known prior to launch. The pilot experienced severe longitudinal pilot-
induced oscillations on landing approach when using the side stick for control.
Postflight inspection revealed that a pin connector in the pitch modulator-
demodulator module was broken by a technician in securing the system after the
final preflight check.
Flight 1-2-7 was made with the pitch damper failed; this was not known prior
to launch. Postflight inspection revealed a dual failure in the pitch mode. A
broken input lead in the pitch working channel (ship's wiring) from the gain-
selector switch to the SAS electronics-case assembly (ECA) was found in the
pilot's console. Als% the gyro return ground lead in the pitch monitor channel
had been omitted during earlier factory rewiring of the ECA. These malfunctions
caused failure of both the monitor and working channel and prevented a
malfunction-light indication. The failures were not detected because of inade-
quate ground check procedures. The pilot experienced moderate longitudinal
pilot-induced oscillations at landing.
Flight 1-3-8 was made with the roll damper failed; this was known prior to
launch. Postflight inspection revealed a broken roll-channel signal lead in the
*In the flight-designation system adapted for the X-I% the first digit
indicates the airplane number; the second is the free-flight number or captive
(C) or abort (A) letter designation; and the third is the flight-attempt number.
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pilot console. This lead is part of the aircraft wiring and was broken when
other work was done in the pilot's console after the final preflight stability-
augmentation-system check. The console was rewired to improve its reliability.
Flight 1-4-9 was made with all stability-augmentation-system channels
functioning satisfactorily. However_postflight inspection revealed a major
leak in the hydraulic line to the stability-augmentation-system yaw servo-
cylinder. Loss of the No. i hydraulic system would have resulted if the flight
had been longer than the estimated 3-minute duration. This was not interpreted
as a flight failure of the SAS.
Flight 1-6-11 was made with roll damper failed; this was known prior to
launch. Postflight inspection revealed a SAS roll-shaper module failure. A
pitch servoamplifier module was also found to be below minimum specification_
but not failed.
Flight I-A-14 was aborted because of a pitch-damper failure prior to launch.
Subsequent ground check revealed an improperly set malfunction-trip level.
Flight 1-19-32 was made with all dampers operating normally. The pilot
turned the pitch damper off for data maneuvering and neglected to reengage it
upon completion. Unaware that the pitch damper was off_ the pilot made a normal
landing; no pilot-induced or other longitudinal oscillations were noted.
SAS operation on all other X-15-1 flights has been satisfactory_ except for
small-amplitude limit cycles in roll experienced in most flights.
x-15-2
Flight 2-C-I was made with all stability-augmentation-system channels
operating normally except for one tripout of the yaw channel. The channel was
immediately reengaged. Subsequent checks revealed high malfunction-detector
voltages. These high voltages were caused by poor adjustmen% which probably
resulted from the potentiometer nuts being tightened after alinement and not
rechecked for possible setting change.
Flight 2-2-6 was made with the roll damper failed; this failure occurred at
launch. Postflight tests revealed normal SAS operation. Preflight checks for
the subsequent flight revealed a failed roll-malfunction-detector module which
was assumed to be intermittently defective. The cause of failure in flight
2-3-9 (see following paragraph) was also the cause of this flight failure.
Flight 2-3- 9 was made with the roll damper failed; this failure occurred at
launch. Postflight checks revealed an incorrectly wired ground lead (ship's
wiring) to the plug of the SAS electronics-case assembly. The error had not
been detected because of inadequate preflight test techniques. Before the cause
of the failure was discovered_ a new SAS was installed and the pilot's console
was rewired to improve reliability.
Flight 2-5-12 was made with all stability-augmentation-system channels
operating normally except for one nuisance tripout of the pitch mode when the
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pilot actuated the fuel-jettison switch. Since induced signals were believed to
be the cause of the tripou% diodes were placed across the liquid-nitrogen-valve
solenoid.
Flight 2-6-13 was made with all stability-augmentation-system channels
operating normally except for a roll-mode nuisance tripout experienced during a
three-revolution maximum-aileron rolling maneuver. Postflight checks revealed
no SAS discrepancies_ and the tripout remains unexplained.
Flight 2-8-16 was made with all stability-augmentation-system channels
operating normally. The pilot deliberately landed with all the channels
inoperative. No unusual oscillations were noted.
Flight 2-9-18was the first flight made with the modified SAS shaping (high-
response filter). The pilot used high gain settings and evaluated the roll
limit cycle. SAS operation was normal except for one unexplained pitch-damper
tripout when the engine master switch was turned off. Upon landing impac% a
high-frequency vibration (mentioned previously) was experienced for 18 seconds
until the pilot realized the source and turned off all the dampers. The vibra-
tion was so severe that the pilot first thought he had lost the nosewheel. A
SAS gain-reduction switch was subsequently installed on the main landing gear in
the belief that only ground contact would provide sufficient excitation.
Flight 2-14-28 was flown with the modified SAS shaping. The system operated
normally except for 57 seconds of high-frequency vibration triggered by a series
of rapid_ large (stop-to-stop) control inputs made by the pilot while evaluating
the side stick. At the beginning of the vibration_ the pilot thought the
phenomena were buffeting. He later sensed that the vibration was primarily in
the pitch mode and made gain reductions in both pitch and yaw. The vibration
ceased. Flight records_ however_ showed the vibration to be primarily in the
roll mode. As a result of this flight experienc% the SAS was restored to its
original shaping (low-response filter).
Flight 2-15-29 was flown with normal damper operation except for one
nuisance tripout of the pitch mode at engine shutdown. Postflight checks
revealed no system discrepancies. Numerous floating and shorted ground shields
in the ship's wiring were found and repaired. The shields are believed to have
caused earlier unexplained tripouts in flight and ground runs.
Flight 2-16-31 was normal until engine star% when the pitch damper failed.
Concurrent with the pilot's second attempt to reengage the pitch mode_ the roll
damper failed but was immediately reengaged and operated satisfactorily for the
remainder of the flight. Postflight checks revealed normal system operation.
The entire SAS was removed from the aircraft for extensive bench checks_ which
revealed broken wafers in the pitch_ roll_ and yaw gain-selector switches. The
switch shafts had been longitudinally drilled and tapped for a new type of knob
prior to fligh% which caused the severe wafer damage. Engine vibration in
flight was sufficient to cause discontinuity. It is believed that the pitch-
switch wafers were partially broken prior to flight 2-15-29 and caused a tripout.
An open resistor in the left servoamplifier module was also found during
the bench check. This was a noncritical item and did not affect system flight
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performance. The module had been rejected a year earlier for the same reason
and had been returned to the contractor. (The resistor opened after 20 minutes
of power-on operation, but performed normally when cold.) This module was
erroneously returned to stock and eventually reinserted into the SAS.
SAS operation on all other X-15-2 flights has been satisfactory except for
the roll limit cycle experienced during most flights with low-response shaping.
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Gain 
setti ng 
1 
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3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Condi tion 
Normal 
functioning 
Mal-
functioning 
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TABLE I . - GAIN AND AUTHORITY OF THE X-15 STABILITY AUGMENTATION SYSTEM 
Gain 
Pitch Roll Yaw Yar 
Servo- Surface Servo- Surface Servo- Surface Servo- Surface cyli nder cylinder cylinder cylinder 
I n./deg/sec Deg/deg/sec I n . /deg/sec Deg/deg/sec In . /deg/sec Deg/deg/sec In./deg/sec Deg/deg/sec 
0 .005 0 . 075 0 .0017 0 .051 0.004 0.03 0.003 0.09 
.O~O .150 . 0033 .100 .008 .oJ . 005 .18 
. 015 .225 . 0050 .150 . 012 .09 . 009 .27 
. 020 
· 300 .0057 .200 . 016 .12 . 012 · 36 
.025 
· 375 . 0083 .250 .020 .15 . 015 .45 
. 030 .450 . 0100 · 300 . 024 .18 . 018 .54 
.035 ·525 .0117 · 350 . 028 .21 . 021 .63 
.040 .600 .0134 .400 .032 .24 .024 
·72 
. 045 .675 . 0150 .450 . 036 .27 . 027 .81 
. 050 
·750 . 0167 ·500 .040 · 30 . 030 · 90 
Servocylinder and surface limits 
Maximum servocylinder Maximum servocyl inder Maximum servocylinder Maximum servocylinder 
stroke = ±1 . 0 inch or stroke = ±1 . 0 inch or stroke = ±1.0 inch or stroke = ±1.0 inch or 
±15° of horizontal ±15° of horizontal ±7 .5° of vertical ±15° of horizontal 
stabilizer stabilizer stabilizer stabilizer 
I 
0.1 inch or 1.50 of 0 .1 inch or 30 dif - 0.1 inch or 0.75 0 of 0 . 1 inch or 30 of dif- I 
horizontal stabilizer ferential stabilizer vertical stabilizer ferentia1 stabilizer 
OTABLEII.- OPERATIONALCOMPON_ITFAILURESOFTHEX-15STABILITYAUGMENTATIONSYS _
Flights
_-15/X_15B-52 Failures
Systemtotal-
Operatinghours
Projectedflightoperation
B-52take-offtoX-15landing 400 200 0 12,000
X-15launchtolanding 400 200 0 12,000
SASdesignspecification 300 300 0 550
Service-lifetest- environmental300 300 ii 635
Reliabilitytest- environmental300 300 3 805
Totalf ightoperations l_380
B-52take-offtoX-15landing 80 45 7
X-15launchtolanding 80 45 1
LRllflightoperation 1,190
Take-offt landing 56 6
Launchtolanding 30 0
XLR99flightoperation 170
Take-offtolanding 24 1
Launchtolanding 15 1
Totalfieldserviceoperations 80 45 83 502(groundpreflightplusflight)
LRllperiod 56 30 73 410
XLR99period 24 15 lO 92
Totaloperations(allgroundplus 80 45 107 1,610flightsincefirst systemdelivery)
I -flightoper-
atinghours
3oo z.5
5o .25
5o .5
461 i .75
500 i .42
180 2.25
7 .16
126 2.25
4.8 ,16
54 2.25
2.4 .16
180 6.3
126 7-8
54 4.8
18o 2O
Average duty
cycle
Mean time
to Reliability,
R
failure
300 99-5 0 0
50 99.5 0 0
i00 99-5 0 0
42 95.9 ll 0
167 99-3 3 0
25.7 91.5 2 0
7 97.6 0 0
2i 89.8 2 o
_ 0 0
54 99.9 o o
2.4 93.5 0 0
6.1 35 27 26
5.6 24.9 25 23
9.2 59.2 2 3
15 26.4 41 31
Component failures
ECA Other SAS components
Servo- Misc. 1 Ship's wiring
Modules 0ther I Gyro GSSA cylinder
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
3
0
0
0
16
16
O
19
iInclude relays (6), chokes (i), potentiometers (9), $ransformers (1), resistors (3), cold solder (3), broken wire (8), sockets/pins (4), pick-offs (3), cam bearings (2).
0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1 3 3 7
i 0 2 6
0 3 1 i
1 3 3 9
TABLE III.- X-I9 SAS MALFUNCTIONS AFFECTING FLIGHT
Operation
Total flight
LRII flight
XLR99 flight
Malfunction
type
Intermittent
Permanent
Intermittent
Permanent
Intermittent
Permanent
Captive
phase
Free-flight
phase
Total
3
i
Flights affected
B-52/x-19 X-15
14 ii
ll 8
3 3
Reliability_ R
B-92/x-19 x-19
91.6 89.0
90.9 97.7
93.1 89.0
88.0 ®
88.o 81.9
99.9 83.5
Total reliability
B-92/x.19 x-15
82.8 86.1
82.0 93.9
84.6 76.5
FO
hD
h9
TABLE IV.- X-15 AVERAGE SAS FAILURE RATES
Operation
B-52/X-15
flights
X-15
flights
Field
operation
period
Total use
period
Initial period
i
First 20 flights
1.5 component fail_res
per flight
0.5 malfunction per
flight
First i0 flights
6 component failures
per flight
0. 7 malfunction per
flight
i
First 150 hours
0.4 component failure
per hour
First i_200 hours
0.06 component fail-
ure per hour
Overall period Final period
$0 flights Last 25 flights
i component failure
per flight
0.2 malfunction per
flight
0.5 component failure
per flight
0.i malfunction per
flight
45 flights Last 15 flights
2 component failures
per flight
0.3 malfunction per
flight
502 hours
,r
0.15 component fail-
ure per hour
i component failure
per flight
0.15 malfunction per
flight
Last i00 hours
0.i component fail-
ure per hour
I;610 hours Last 200 hours
0.07 component fail- 0.03 component fail-
ure per hour ure per hour
DO. 75
k_....... J
18.08
22.36 _i
LIJ
Figure i.- Three-view drawing of the X-15 airplane. All dimensions in feet.
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Figure 4.- X-15 basic-control-system characteristics.
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(k) Center-stick roll displacement measured at 28-inch radius_ nonlinear gearing
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Figure 4.- Concluded. 39
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A Gyro package
B Pilot console - function-switch assembly (GSSA)
C Electronic case assembly
D Right pitch-roll servocylinder
E Left pitch-roll servocylinder
F Yawservocylinder
Figure 5.- Relative locations of SAScomponents in X-15 airplane.
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Figure 6.- Functional block diagram of the stability augmentation system.
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without SAS.
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Figure 9.- Limit-cycle characteristics. M = 2.09 Kq = O.
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Figure i0.- Failure history of SAS components.
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Figure ii.- SAS component failures during the field operation period.
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Figure 12.- SAS malfunctions affecting flight.
